

**Cross-cutting cleavages:
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Terra Lliure, and the centrality of social networks**
Kaitlyn Chriswell

Senior Honors Thesis
Presented to the Department of Political Science
Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences
Northwestern University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Honors in Political Science
April 30, 2014
Advisor: Ana Arjona
Seminar Director: Georgia Kernell

Abstract

Why do some armed groups succeed where others do not? Both the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain have been home to nationalist, separatist armed groups, yet Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) has persisted for much longer in the Basque region than Terra Lliure did in Catalonia. This paper seeks to explain how social networks affect armed group viability -- whether a group "succeeds" and continues to exist or "fails" and dies out. It will specifically focus on how pre-existing social networks that are both tight-knit and heterogeneous in nature benefit armed groups and contribute to the longevity of an armed group. Two hypotheses are proposed in order to link pre-existing social networks to an armed group's success or failure. Primary source survey and interview evidence I collected from the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain serves as a basis for examining these hypotheses. I argue that differences observed in the social networks of the two regions help explain the failure of Terra Lliure, despite the success of ETA in otherwise very similar environments.

Keywords: social networks; armed group; viability; Basque Country; Catalonia

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge, first and foremost, Professor Ana Arjona for her support and guidance throughout the entirety of this project. Without her help, I could not have designed or completed this research. I would also like to acknowledge Professors Will Reno and Georgia Kernell, as well as Ph.D student Mara Suttman-Lea for offering their critical feedback and perspective, time and time again. Thank you to the Office of Undergraduate Research, and specifically Peter Civetta, for not only funding but also actively encouraging my research pursuits. I also find it necessary to thank Professor Jeff Rice, who has, since my first year on campus, pushed me to think bigger and do more, taking advantage of all Northwestern has to offer. Additional acknowledgements go to the Frozen soundtrack, ramen, chai tea, and towers 3E and 1S of Northwestern's University Library for making this project possible. I would like to thank my friends, roommates, and family, on campus and at home, for keeping me sane.

Finally, I must express my deepest gratitude to all of my friends in the Basque Country, for taking me into their homes, whether for a meal or a few weeks of housing, and also for introducing me to their friends, families, and acquaintances. Without their help, I could not have developed the networks necessary to complete the surveys or interviews necessary for this project.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--------------|---|
| Pg. 5 | List of Illustrations |
| 6 | List of Maps |
| 7 | List of Tables |
| 8 | 1: Introduction |
| 11 | 2: Current Understandings of Networks and Armed Groups |
| 13 | 3: Theory |
| 21 | 4: Historical Overview – Spain and its nationalisms |
| 26 | 5: Paired Comparison – Justified selection of 2 cases |
| 30 | 6: Empirics |
| 33 | 7 : Survey Data Comparison |
| 39 | 8: Basque Social Networks |
| 44 | 9: Catalan Social Networks |
| 47 | 10: Alternative Explanations |
| 50 | 11: Conclusion |
| 52 | Bibliography |
| 55 | Appendix 1: Survey Questions |
| 57 | Appendix 2: Translated Survey Questions |

List of Illustrations

Figure 1: Information available to an armed group as a mechanism linking social network structure to viability of armed group.

Figure 2: Legitimacy as a mechanism linking social network structure to viability of armed group.

Figures 3 & 4: The regional dances of Catalonia and the Basque Country, which were outlawed under Franco as deviating from the national culture.

List of Maps

Map 1: The shifting boundaries of the Christian kingdoms within Spain between 1030 and the 1500s

List of Tables

Table 1: Paired comparison of Catalan and Basque armed nationalist groups, Terra Lliure and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).

Table 2: Results of surveys distributed in Catalonia and the Basque Country

1. Introduction

The study of conflict lends itself to positive cases since collecting data on the existence of rebel groups and their perpetration of violence is easier than collecting data on rebel groups failing to attain that capability. However, this approach is problematic because it ignores the fact that most rebel groups never constitute a successful threat to the state but instead disband (Lewis 2013). By studying such a small subset of cases, namely those groups that are successful, the question of rebel group viability is lost. What makes a rebel group successful? What differentiates groups that are successful from groups that fail? These questions should be central to the study of conflict because understanding the factors that lead to the sustainability of rebel groups helps us better understand the phenomenon of continued violence and conflict.

In this paper I propose two hypotheses explaining how social networks affect the success or failure of rebel groups. First, I link the viability of rebel groups to the social network structure of the region in which they operate, arguing that rebel groups rely on information from civilians to perpetrate effective, selective violence. Effective violence constitutes an effective threat to the state, while ineffective violence leads a group to dissolve. A region with denser, more heterogeneous social networks facilitates the circulation of information. Therefore, denser (tight-knit), heterogeneous social networks can be linked to the success of rebel groups. In addition, I introduce a second concept, in which social network structure affects an armed group's legitimacy. Legitimacy comes from a group's ability to control the rhetoric surrounding violence. Dense, heterogeneous social networks allow the armed group to circulate information about its use of violence. The circulation of information leading the public to view the violence as selective will increase the legitimacy of the group by continuing civilian support. This legitimacy allows the group to be successful because armed groups rely on the local population for support,

protection, and supplies. I will evaluate each of these two hypotheses using a paired comparison of the Basque and Catalan armed, nationalist groups of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Freedom and Homeland) and Terra Lliure (Free Land).

Often, when comparing the various nationalisms within Spain, the division between Basque and Catalan nationalisms is seen as a dichotomy between violence and non-violence. Several authors have attempted to explain the emergence of violence in the Basque region by comparing it to what they identify as non-violent Catalan nationalism. The dichotomies between the movements are described as violent versus peaceful, terrorist versus willing to compromise (Conversi 1997). A few authors attribute these contrasts to regional linguistic factors, although this is not a widespread view. For example, one author argues that although both Catalonia and the Basque region have their own languages, the similarities between Catalan and Castilian Spanish allow for better mutual understanding when discussing nationalism compared to the linguistically unique Basque language (Lilli 1994). Alternatively, the regional difference can also be perceived as a cultural one. According to cultural explanations, in contrast to the Basque region, Catalonia had a flexible political and social culture that facilitated mutual agreements, allowing it to renounce violent expressions of nationalism (Hargreaves 2000). Finally, the difference can be seen in the different histories of the respective regions, namely, the historical existence of a Catalan nation separate from Castile and Leon, but not a separate Basque nation (Mastrovito 1993). However, it is misleading to characterize the Catalan nationalism as non-violent. Catalonia also had a nationalist armed group, Terra Lliure. Although Terra Lliure did not persist as long as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), it is inaccurate to overlook the presence of violence in Catalan nationalism. Therefore, the question becomes, “Why has ETA persisted as an

armed group while Terra Lliure has not?” What explains the respective success or failure of an armed group?

The viability of rebel groups is a question with implications for our understanding of the processes of both war and peace. Conceptualizing the role of networks in a rebel group’s continued existence or disbanding can expand our knowledge of the dynamics of civil war. These dynamics are important beyond academic research because they inform counterinsurgency policy decisions as well as other forms of international intervention in civil wars.

2. Current Understandings of Networks and Armed Groups

Although the study of conflict is an expanding field, research has often focused on the initial stages of conflict: its causes, participants, and tactics. Few authors have explored the question of rebel group viability, instead preferring to focus on those groups that persist (Lewis 2013). Seeking to fill this gap, Lewis asserts that "...the structure and geographic dispersion of communication networks among civilians where a rebel group initially operates is a determinant of whether the group becomes viable" (2). While this general principle seems to be wide-reaching, her examination of rebel groups in Uganda leads her to conclude that ethnic homogeneity is the factor facilitating the viability of these groups (Lewis 2013). Thus, without further research, her evaluation of "communication networks" is limited to areas where ethnicity is a relevant identity marker.

Furthermore, most political science analyses of how networks function in civil war fail to link social networks to whether or not a particular group continues to exist. Instead, social networks are compared over time in order to assess the varying effects of civil war on pre-existing networks (Wood 2008). Social networks are also observed to cause different divisions of labor along lines of gender between rebels in a single organization (Parkinson 2013). They are also theorized as influencing a rebel group's use of resources (Staniland 2012). However, our understanding of social networks and civil war remains limited, especially in regard to a group's respective success or failure.

Meanwhile, the field of sociology has also exerted efforts to understand the importance of social networks. Some recent scholars have problematized the common approach to analyzing network effects. Gould (1991) points to the tendency to measure networks by counting the number of ties, which limits the study of network effects to an individual level variable. The gap

he identifies is therefore twofold, encompassing both network structure and multiplexity. Utilizing data from patterns of insurgency during the Paris Commune of 1871, he illustrates the importance of the interaction between pre-existing social ties in combination with the social ties created by mobilization. He argues that the greatest impact comes from groupings that mostly, but not completely, follow the pre-existing social structure. However, it is unclear whether or not social networks function similarly in asymmetric civil wars, as opposed to conventional civil wars.

Thus, the question still remains: How do social networks affect the viability of armed groups? In the following pages, I present two possible explanations, using a case study comparison of Terra Lliure and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna to illustrate my claims. This contributes to the existing literature by offering two mechanisms that can explain the effect of social networks on armed group viability even in environments of asymmetric civil war and the absence of ethnicity as an important identity marker.

3. Theory

A large body of literature demonstrates the co-dependent nature of armed groups and civilians. Scholars and rebel leaders have both emphasized the necessity of civilian support in launching a rebellion (Guevara 1960, Zedong 1961, Galula 1964). In his efforts to explain variation in violence, Weinstein 2006 also examines the importance of support in the form of a group's "social endowment". Civilians have the power to either aid or ignore the needs of an armed group. Aiding the group or ignoring the armed group's needs may be an individual or collective decision, but in either case, citizens exist in the context of a community. Therefore, a logical place to begin examining the interactions between armed groups and civilians is with the pre-existing social networks of civilians.

I theorize two ways in which pre-existing networks could explain the success or failure of these respective armed groups. Neither mechanism is necessarily exclusive; that is, it is possible the two mechanisms work concurrently, and this possibility will be explored in a later section. However, to best understand them as distinct mechanisms, each will be examined separately below. Each mechanism rests on the contention that armed groups are successful where both tight-knit and heterogeneous networks exist.

The first way in which networks could affect the viability of armed groups relies on an adaptation of some principles developed by Kalyvas. Kalyvas (2006) argues that information is central to an armed group's ability to perpetrate violence. According to his theory, demonstrated with evidence from the Greek civil war, the probability of violence is highest where denunciations and defections both occur. In his terminology, the information comes in the form of denunciations: one civilian provides information about another civilian's activities with the opposing rebel group. However, my definition of "information" is not limited to denunciations.

Instead, information is not only reporting on the defection of others, but also encompasses broader, monitoring activities. This is key because a rebel group's success depends not only on assessing defection, but other threats to the group as well. Kalyvas' model takes information as a constant, assuming it is readily available, since denunciations vary based on level of control exerted by a rebel group. Kalyvas, therefore, does not make any claims about the effects of social structure on rebel group viability. By analyzing the type of social networks that exist where a rebel group operates, I take his theory back one step, removing the constant from information, and ask the question, "What environment allows this information to be available for an armed group to use?"

The key aspects of a network I identify as important in explaining the success of an armed group are density and composition. Density refers to the compactness of networks, which can be characterized as either tight-knit or disperse. A tight-knit network is one in which individuals have an identifiable group of close friends with whom they have established trust and with whom they communicate more frequently in comparison to other friends and acquaintances. Communication is not necessarily face-to-face, but can include conversations or contact via SMS, email, Skype, phone call, etc. In contrast, disperse networks are characterized by limited and sporadic contact, even among those individuals identified as "close friends" rather than merely "friends" or "acquaintances". It is important to note that a network's density, according to this definition, is a function of the quantity and frequency of communication between individuals. Thus, networks can have a wide geographic spread and can still be tight-knit. Density is important because tight-knit networks have a higher amount of trust and information can be shared in confidence.

Composition refers to the demographics of an individual's close friends, with networks either heterogeneous or homogenous. I am limiting the scope of network composition to one's close friends rather than their friends or acquaintances since the first key aspect of networks I identify as important is density. While many aspects of identity can be deemed important in a consideration of social networks, I define heterogeneity as being identified by differences in socioeconomic status, place of origin, and political opinions among close friends. The more categories in which difference occurs, the more heterogeneous a society is.

I choose these aspects of identity as indicative of heterogeneity because they are particularly divisive in societies. That is to say, for many reasons, communities are often based on similarities in socioeconomic status or place of origin. Working-class, middle-class, and wealthy individuals typically reside in different neighborhoods. Especially among immigrants, communities can also be divided by place of origin. This can result from a number of reasons including the desire to live near someone you know or someone who speaks your language. In contrast, neighborhoods are not usually divided based on political views or levels of political participation. Rather, within communities, individuals likely interact with others who have different political views or levels of political participation than themselves. However, within these communities, friend groups are often distinguished by similar worldviews, including political opinions and levels of political participation. So while political opinions and political participation are not indicative of homogeneity or heterogeneity between communities, they are important for distinguishing those characteristics within a given community. Given the characteristics described above, it is important to keep in mind that heterogeneity, in this paper, is the act of crossing existing cleavages and is not a lack of cleavages in a social network.

The assertion that heterogeneity in networks is a positive attribute for armed groups functioning in those areas contradicts some of the existing literature. Many authors cite homogeneity as a key factor in mobilization (Lewis 2013). This existing literature is also consistent with the characterization of many civil wars as “ethnic” conflicts, in which mobilized individuals fight due to “tribal” or local inter-group disputes. However, few authors have analyzed the mechanisms by which heterogeneity affects an armed group. Rather, in theorizing the positive attributes of homogeneity, heterogeneity is assumed to be a negative attribute, or a barrier, to armed group viability. I contend, instead, that heterogeneity is also beneficial for armed groups, but that it must be considered as acting on different mechanisms than homogeneity.

Thus, contrary to these hypotheses, heterogeneity in civilian social structure can actually benefit an armed group. Heterogeneous networks among civilians have two main advantages. First, information circulates among a broader citizen base even when it stems from a single subgroup. This is because in heterogeneous social networks, even close friends have varying identities. Thus, for example, a piece of news or information could be circulating in the low-income community that Sarah belongs to. Her close friend, Elizabeth is upper-middle class, and therefore does not have firsthand access to this information. However, since the two are part of the same tight-knit network, their heterogeneous identities allow them access to information previously limited to a single community.

A second advantage is that in heterogeneous networks information is likely to be confirmed from multiple kinds of sources. This is distinct from information merely confirmed from multiple sources. In homogenous environments, information may be confirmed by several individuals; however, these individuals, being from the same types of communities, likely

learned of the information from the same kind of source. In contrast, in heterogeneous environments, information is more likely to be confirmed using multiple kinds of sources. Returning to the example of Sarah and Elizabeth, we will add a third friend, Lauren, who only knows Elizabeth. Lauren, who is also upper-middle class, informs Sofi of Event X. Sofi also hears of Event X from Sarah, who is part of a different community than Lauren. Thus, not only do multiple individuals confirm the information, but each source first received this information from different sources. These two concepts are a distinct advantage because even if the armed group is composed primarily of individuals who share certain political beliefs or other attributes that might normally limit their access to information, heterogeneous civilian networks will overcome this problem and make the information available beyond the borders of their own communities.

The assertion that heterogeneity is important for the success of an armed group is not to say that homogenous social networks do not also have advantages for armed groups. However, existing literature has largely ignored the benefits of existing heterogeneity and instead attributed armed group failure to a lack of homogeneity in certain regions. For this reason, further examination into heterogeneous networks is warranted. Homogeneity and heterogeneity affect armed group success in different ways, and the mechanisms by which the two types of networks affect the success or failure of armed groups are distinct. According to this understanding, heterogeneity is a sufficient, not a necessary condition for armed group success.

Returning once again to Kalyvas 2006, it is important to remember that denunciations facilitate selective violence. While the mechanism for Kalyvas is effectiveness (i.e. – an armed group's ability to perpetrate violence), I identify a second mechanism connecting information to the success or failure of an armed group: legitimacy. In this understanding, information more

broadly is critical to the success or failure of the armed group because it will only be viewed as legitimate if it uses violence selectively to advance the organization's goals. In this way, the success or failure of an armed group relies on the availability of information as determined by the density and composition of social networks in a particular region.




Figure 1: Information available to an armed group as a mechanism linking social network structure to viability of armed group.

A second mechanism by which networks can affect the success of armed groups is by influencing the information that circulates to the public. Deviating from Kalyvas once again, perhaps it is not the actual *use* of selective versus indiscriminate violence that matters, rather what affects the success or failure of armed groups is how civilians *perceive* the violence. This second mechanism contends that the circulation of information is important for its effects on civilians' perception, not for its effects on the knowledge available to an armed group. The information flow is reversed from the previous model. Instead of civilians providing information to the armed group, the armed group circulates information to the civilian population about its activities. In much the same way as previously explained, tight-knit, heterogeneous networks

facilitate the flow of information to a broad base of civilians. Although the armed group itself may be relatively homogenous, if the social networks are heterogeneous, information can be dispersed to a wide range of civilians, even by a non-diverse subgroup.

The circulation of information is important for the armed organization, according to this second mechanism, because the armed group's success depends in part on the civilians' perceptions of legitimacy or illegitimacy. These perceptions are key since insurgent organizations rely on the local population for material support, as well as other logistical efforts (even acts as passive as refusing to give information to the police about the armed group's activities can qualify as important logistical efforts leading to the group's continuation).

In a consideration of this second mechanism of legitimacy, the kind of information that is important in circulation is whether or not the group's violence was selective. According to Kalyvas, armed groups prefer selective to indiscriminate violence since the latter leads to uncertainty among the civilian population and makes consolidating control difficult. Therefore, extrapolating from this idea, one can reasonably imagine that an armed group controlling the rhetoric will be able to effectively portray its violence as selective. In doing so, it will add to the group's sense of legitimacy among local citizens, allowing the group to continue to exist by reinforcing its citizen base. The establishment of legitimacy among the local population depends on the existence of tight-knit, heterogeneous networks to circulate the "selectivity of violence" as according to the rhetoric created by the armed group.






Figure 2: Legitimacy as a mechanism linking social network structure to viability of armed group.

In the following chapters, each of these two mechanisms will be examined using the paired case comparison of the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain. The following chapter begins by giving a brief overview of the relevant historical situation of Spain, and of these particular regions and nationalisms within Spain. Then, I will establish a better understanding of the comparative value of these two armed movements (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna and Terra Lliure, respectively). Following this brief historical overview, the chapter will continue by outlining the characteristics which make these Basque and Catalan armed movements a good comparative case in which to demonstrate my hypothesis and two mechanisms.

4. Historical Overview – Spain and its nationalisms

In order to understand the context in which ETA and Terra Lliure arose, it is of central importance to examine elements of Spanish history in relation to these nationalisms. Historical differences in political/territorial rule and language are often cited as bases for both the Catalan and Spanish nationalisms. Additionally, it is important to consider the dictatorship of Francisco Franco and his repression of regional nationalisms as a possible influence on the historical climate of ETA and Terra Lliure.

The existence of distinct nationalisms within Spain is often linked to the process by which the country itself was formed. In the 15th century, the territory now called Spain consisted of separate Christian kingdoms. In previous centuries, these Christian kingdoms had fought amongst themselves, but had also formed and re-formed alliances to fight the Moors. Despite these alliances, the kingdoms remained separate entities. However, the death of King Henry IV of Castile in 1474 changed the political dynamics. Following his death, there were several contenders for the throne – among them, Henry’s half-sister Queen Isabella I of Castile, who would rule with her husband King Ferdinand II. Their marriage in 1469 united the crowns of Castile and Aragon, respectively. Many cite the union of the “Catholic Monarchs”, Isabella and Ferdinand, as the beginning of the creation of Spain. This is important because although under the “Catholic Monarchs” the nation of Spain was consolidated, the regions of Navarre (modern day Basque Country) and Aragon (modern day Catalonia) were allowed to function under their own historic laws, or “*fueros*”. In fact, the Castilian kings reinforced the validity of these “*fueros*” by incorporating them into their royal oath (Strong). The shifting boundaries of the Spanish kingdoms can be seen in Figure 3 below, as well as their consolidation under King Ferdinand II and Queen Isabella I.



Map 1: The shifting boundaries of the Christian kingdoms within Spain between 1030 and the 1500s.¹

However, the balance of power was upset again during the War of Spanish Succession between 1701 and 1714. The victor and therefore new king, Philip V, signed the “Decreto de Nueva Planta” after capturing the throne. This new law revoked the majority of the historical rights and privileges the different kingdoms had retained under previous monarchs. The suppression of the *fueros* was particularly acute in the Aragon and Navarre, the two kingdoms making up present day Catalonia and the Basque region, respectively. This would become

¹ Bury, J.B., ed. "Maps of the Spanish Kingdoms 1030 A.D. - 1556 A.D." *Atlas To Freeman's Historical Geography*. 3rd ed. N.p.: Longmans Green and, 1903. N. pag. *University of Texas Libraries*. Web. <https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/spanish_kingdoms.html>.

important later when, for example, Sabino Arana founded the Basque Nationalist Party on the central tenants of Catholicism, *fueros*, and separate historical kingdoms. The centralist repression described previously continued under several subsequent monarchs as well.

A second, but equally cited historical basis for both the Catalan and Basque nationalisms is the existence of a regional language distinct from Castilian Spanish. The Catalan language evolved from Latin in the 9th century, and was the dominant language of the Crown of Aragon during the Low Middle Ages. However, the union of Aragon with Castile in 1469 via the marriage of the Catholic Monarchs marked the beginning of a decline in the Catalan language. Exacerbating this situation was the fact that Catalan was banned in the early 18th century. There was a temporary resurgence of Catalan in 19th century literature, which was accompanied by a standardization of orthography and grammar. Under the Second Spanish Republic, Catalan was recognized as an official language. However, this Second Republic was short lived and after the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Franco banned Catalan once again.

In contrast to Catalan, the origins of the Basque language, Euskara, are unknown. For this reason, linguists consider Euskara to be a language isolate. Euskara Batua, the standardized version of the language, was not developed until the late 1960s, but it was considered necessary because of the great variation in the five main dialects. Although less is known about the historical use of Euskara, a local charter allowed the use of Euskara in legal processes in the 13th and 14th centuries. Similarly to Catalan, however, the use of Euskara was made illegal under the Franco dictatorship.

On this note, it is important to discuss the status of regional nationalisms more generally under the Franco dictatorship. Francisco Franco came to power in Spain through his role as a Nationalist general in the Spanish Civil War who helped defeat the Republican government. In

October of 1936, Franco was named Generalísimo of the National Army and Head of State. The dictatorship was authoritarian, conservative, and traditional. All political parties other than Franco's own, the Falange, were also prohibited. This meant that the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) was banned in 1939, and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) also went into exile. Thus, political representation of nationalist identities disappeared during the dictatorship.

Franco's nationalism promoted a unitary national identity not only by eliminating all political competition, but also by repressing Spain's cultural and linguistic diversity. Under Franco, any signs of regional difference were outlawed and violators of the law were severely punished via violent police repression. This meant that the use of both Catalan and Euskara was made illegal. All legal, government, and commercial documents were exclusively in Castilian and all others were voided. Additionally, only Castilian could be spoken in schools and shops. Unofficially, the languages were still spoken in some homes, but there was always a risk of being discovered and potentially punished by the local police.

Additionally, the distinct local customs and traditions of each region were suppressed. Franco selected certain customs as "national traditions", like flamenco, for example, although flamenco originated in the southern region of Andalusia. On the other hand, the Sardana, the national dance of Catalonia, was outlawed. In this way, the cultural censorship was both arbitrary, and targeted to repress those regions with a history of vibrant nationalisms, such as the Basque and Catalan regions. Both the cultural and linguistic repressions became less severe over time, but the repression never completely disappeared until after the establishment of the current Spanish form of government.



Figures 3 & 4: The regional dances of Catalonia (left)² and the Basque Country (right)³, which were outlawed under Franco as deviating from the national culture.

A background in both the early and more recent histories of Spain is important to contextualize the existence of ETA and Terra Lliure as armed, nationalist, separatist groups. The creation of Spain via the consolidation of various, separate kingdoms, as well as the repression of nationalisms under Franco are particularly relevant to an understanding of modern day nationalisms within Spain. Additionally, the fact that both organizations share a very common history as part of Spain is particularly beneficial for this paper, as will be examined more in depth below.

² Digital image. *Notícies Berguedà: BergActual*. N.p., n.d. Web. <<http://www.bergactual.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/DSC02529.jpg>>.

³ Digital image. *Wikipedia*. N.p., n.d. Web.

<http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c8/Basque_dancers_01.jpg>

5. Paired Comparison – Justified selection of 2 cases

In order to illustrate these two hypotheses and evaluate their viability, I will examine the cases of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and Terra Lliure. Pairing the Basque and Catalan cases has several advantages, and it is important to understand these advantages before comparing the viability of each rebel group.

First, both groups emerged in the same context: the Spanish transition to democracy, in the post-Franco period. This transitional period is key to an understanding of the viability of each armed group. Since both evolved during the period when the Spanish democracy was weak, it is less likely that the time period is a significant factor impacting the success/failure of the respective groups. While it is true that both groups emerged during the transition to democracy, it is important to recognize that there are differences between the years in which ETA and Terra Lliure were formed. Although ETA was established in 1959, it did not engage in violence until 1968. We will consider 1968, then, as the year marking its emergence as an armed organization. However, Terra Lliure was founded in 1978, a decade later. This is, importantly, still during the transition to and consolidation of Spanish democracy; however, as a transitional period, it is true that the years 1968 and 1978 are best classified as similar temporal conditions.

Additionally, both regions existed under similar conditions prior to the establishment of democracy in Spain. The repressive policies of the Franco dictatorship are often cited as an explanation of persistent violence in the Basque region. All demonstrations of regional pride and heritage were outlawed, and many were strictly punished as anti-Spanish and anti-nationalist. However, this explanation ceases to be sufficient when one considers that Catalan nationalism was repressed – both culturally and linguistically – by the Franco dictatorship as well.

Furthermore, both armed groups faced the same opposition, the Spanish government. This is significant because one key factor in the success of an armed group is the capability of its opposition. The surveillance capabilities of a government are extremely relevant when theorizing about the continued existence of an armed group since the better a government can collect reliable information about an armed group, the more easily it can thwart its activities and arrest its members. The same is also true of a government's tactical abilities – even with the appropriate information from surveillance, a government must still be able to act accordingly and utilize the information to weaken or exterminate an armed group. With this in mind, examining two armed groups under the same national government helps eliminate the oppositional factors as confounding variables.

Finally, each group was founded on a leftist, Marxist, nationalist, and separatist ideology. These similarities are important when considering explanations of variation in violence based on “initial endowments” such as Weinstein (2006). In Weinstein's categorization, both Terra Lliure and ETA had social, not economic endowments. Since both their respective nationalisms are based both on linguistic and cultural differences, lacking external funding or lootable resources, current explanations fail to account for the observed difference in sustained violent activity.

It is important to keep in mind that the above similarities are important because they indicate comparable initial conditions for ETA and Terra Lliure as armed organizations. These similarities together form a solid basis for comparison, eliminating many of the typical explanations for why ETA continued to exist while Terra Lliure did not. The relative success of ETA in comparison to Terra Lliure can be quantified in several ways: comparing the duration of each group, the number of attacks perpetrated, and the number of deaths caused. In each of those

categories, ETA was more successful, lasting longer temporally, perpetrating more attacks, and causing more deaths than Terra Lliure.

Table 1 synthesizes the similarities in initial conditions and differences in outcomes discussed above.

Table 1: Paired comparison of Catalan and Basque armed nationalist groups, Terra Lliure and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).

| | Catalonia (Terra Lliure) | Basque Country (ETA) |
|---|--|---|
| Basis of nationalism | Linguistic and cultural differences | Linguistic and cultural differences |
| Type of violence | Terrorism | Terrorism |
| Ideology of armed group | Leftist, Marxist, Nationalist, Separatist | Leftist, Marxist, Nationalist, Separatist |
| Goal of armed group | Separate Basque state | Separate Catalan state |
| Duration of armed group | Dissolved in 1995 after mass arrests of members. 17 years of violence. | Ceasefire declared in 2011, but group still exists. 43 years of violence. |
| Number of “atentados” attacks/attempts | ~125 | More than 700 |
| Number of deaths | 1 | 829 |
| Number of members detained/arrested | 300 | More than 700 currently in jail, with hundreds more |

| | | |
|--|--|-------------------|
| | | already released. |
|--|--|-------------------|

It is true that no two examples make a perfect comparison in a case study. Unlike in an experiment, conditions cannot be externally controlled in order to isolate the importance of a single, independent variable: in this case, social networks. Therefore, due to the lack of controls in a case study, it is more likely that there are confounding variables that may possibly affect the observed outcomes. However, when two cases exist under similar conditions, the possible effects of confounding variables are decreased. Therefore, the Basque and Catalan cases, with the important similarities outlined above, form a reliable basis for comparison when evaluating the hypotheses of social networks effects on armed group viability.

6. Empirics

In order to illustrate these two hypotheses and evaluate their viability, I rely on a comparative study of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna and Terra Lliure. One limitation of my approach is that the paired comparison only provides the specific context of Spain in which to test my hypotheses. However, the benefit is that in focusing on these two, armed groups, I can more fully examine the causal mechanisms linking social networks, information, violence, and the success or failure of each group. This allows for a detailed examination of the proposed hypothesis in the Spanish nationalist context. Furthermore, in this scope, I can limit the possibility of confounding variables: both groups emerged under the same dictatorship and transition to democracy, experienced the same national economic policies, and face the same national government police force and intelligence system. The benefits of this consistency will be further examined in the section on paired comparison.

The majority of my data is qualitative, excerpted from interviews and questionnaires I conducted myself in the Basque region during Summer 2013 as well as interviews and questionnaires I gathered in Winter 2014 from the Catalan region. All interviews and questionnaires were distributed using the snowball technique for sampling. Snowball sampling uses participants to contact other, potential participants. It relies inherently on the existence of networks and builds credibility of the researcher through referrals from one participant to the next (Denscombe 1997).

The snowball technique is most often used when populations are difficult to contact for one of several reasons, including when the topic of research is a sensitive or private issue (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). This is because “Where research is perceived as a threat, or where there is intrusion into the private sphere (Platzer and James 1997), referral chains can offer

an element of anonymity, while sensitive contact allows participants to express concerns about the importance or complexity of their situation (Streeton, Cooke, and Campbell 2004). In the case of this research, it was necessary to use the snowball technique when locating former ETA and Terra Lliure members, since membership remains a private matter even once one is no longer a member of the organization. Additionally, in the Basque region, even outside the context of ETA and armed conflict, views on nationalism are not openly discussed.

As with any approach to collecting research data, there are advantages and disadvantages to consider. The snowball technique is a means to access certain populations of individuals, but by relying on network ties, it introduces bias (Street, Cook, and Campbell 2004). Furthermore, it is unrealistic to generalize from snowballing data, since there is no way to ensure that it is close to representative of an entire population (Street, Cook, and Campbell 2004). However, the snowball technique continues to be used in the social sciences, and has not lost its relevancy despite the disadvantages it presents.

Furthermore, the use of snowball sampling in conflict environments has been well documented and its validity evaluated (Cohen and Arieli 2011). Cohen and Arieli 2011 maintain that there are “unique advantages, utilities, and applications” for the use of snowballing techniques in conflict environments. However, one could also imagine that post-conflict environments in which the issues from conflict are still relevant would function similarly. Multiple generations of Basque and Catalan residents lived under the Franco dictatorship, and the issues surrounding nationalism and repression are particularly raw. Therefore, snowball sampling allows the establishment of trust in order to breach these topics not normally discussed.

In addition to my own research data, I also draw on interviews conducted by reporters and other scholars in order to illustrate that my hypothesis is applicable beyond the individuals I

myself was in contact with. This should contribute validity to the results obtained by the snowballing technique, lending credibility to the range of individuals reached in my snowballing.

7. Survey Data Comparison

The survey itself is constructed to measure the relevant aspects of my hypothesis in order to later make a comparison between the Catalan and Basque responses. The first question, “In what year were you born?” is relevant to assess whether the subject population is of the correct age for my research. It is important for the purposes of this research to target individuals who are residents of the Basque or Catalan regions and who were between the ages of 12-18 during the Spanish transition to democracy in the 1980s. The ages of 12-18 are a critical period because ETA and Terra Lliure interacted most with networks in this age range, since its members were also recruited relatively young. Furthermore, it is important to study the social networks as they existed in the 1980s rather than as they exist today in order to recognize that armed groups (as well as other cultural changes) have the potential to change network configurations.

In order to measure and compare network density, I used a series of questions. After asking participants to identify the number of close friends they had during this time period, participants are asked to respond to the following: How many times did you communicate with the close friends you just mentioned? How many times per week did you see these close friends in person? How long, on average, did you spend together each time you hung out? The frequency of communication, both in person and otherwise, between participants and their close friends operationalizes network density. In this context, more frequent communication indicates denser social networks, and less frequent communication indicates more disperse social networks. The measurement of time spent with close friends acknowledges that dense networks could be characterized either by frequent, shorter meetings among close friends, but that a network could be equally as dense when characterized by less frequent, but longer meetings among those same individuals.

Additionally, participants were asked to respond to the questions above in the context of “other friends” they do not consider to be “close friends”. The comparison between participants’ responses referring to close friends versus other friends is important because some individuals are more/less social than others more generally. Thus, the frequency and duration of socializing with close friends for an individual is contextualized, proportional to the amount of time he or she spends socializing in general. The recognition that not all individuals spend the same amount of time socializing necessitates this comparison between close friends and other friends.

Finally, a series of questions in the survey serve as proxies to measure network composition. Participants were asked to classify their 5 closest friends from this time period on each of several different components: born outside the Basque/Catalan region, language (as a proxy for ethnicity), socioeconomic status, views on nationalism, and support of the same political party. As described previously in the theory section, for these purposes heterogeneous networks are defined as crossing existing cleavages and homogeneous networks as existing within cleavages. Thus, more heterogeneous networks will have more variation on the above questions, whereas more homogeneous networks will consist primarily of individuals who are similar in those categories.

Table 2: Results of surveys distributed in Catalonia and the Basque Country

| Question | Catalonia | Basque Country |
|--|------------------|-----------------------|
| Average year of birth of respondents | 1960.132 | 1958.944 |
| Average number of close friends | 5.683 | 5.285 |
| Average number of times per week they communicated with close friends | 5.542 | 6.714 |

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| Average number of times per week they spent time with close friends in person | 3.481 | 5 |
| Average amount of time spent with close friends per visit | <1 hour: 6.67% 1-2 hours: 33.33% >2 hours: 60% | <1 hour: 0% 1-2 hours: 26.67% >2 hours: 73.33% |
| Average number of times per week they communicated with other friends | 2.56 | 4.692 |
| Average number of times per week they spent time with other friends in person | 1.22 | 2.067 |
| Average amount of time spent with other friends per visit | <1 hour: 35.71% 1-2 hours: 32.14% >2 hours: 32.14% | <1 hour: 23.08% 1-2 hours: 46.15% >2 hours: 30.77% |
| Average class distribution of 5 closest friends | | |
| Average number of 5 closest friends with whom they spoke regional language (Catalan/Basque) | 4.138 | .357 |
| Average number of 5 closest friends with whom they spoke national language (Castillian Spanish) | 1.727 | 4.643 |
| Average number of 5 closest friends born outside their region (Catalonia/Basque Country) | 1.148 | 1.067 |
| Average number of 5 closest friends with similar opinions on nationalism | 3.667 | 3.867 |

As can be seen in the above Table 2, social networks in the Basque Country can be characterized as more tight-knit than social networks in Catalonia. On average, Basque respondents reported communicating with close friends slightly more frequently than Catalan respondents. Additionally, when they did see their close friends, Basque respondents spent more time, on average, with those close friends. Almost 75% of Basque respondents spent an average of two or more hours with their close friends. The characterization of social networks as more tight-knit in the Basque Country also takes into consideration the frequency at which Basque and Catalan respondents socialized more generally. The Basque respondents reported a higher level of communication with other friends as well, although they were less likely to meet up with other friends in person. Still, Catalans reported spending fewer than one hour with those they identified as their other friends, whereas Basques were less likely to spend fewer than one hour even with those classified as other friends.

However, the survey results contradict the expected results in that Basque social networks are not demonstrated to be more heterogeneous than Catalan social networks. This is demonstrated by the similarity in the responses when Basque and Catalan respondents were asked to describe the characteristics of their five closest friends. One can see that differences are not observed when considering ethnicity as a factor. Respondents from the two regions reported almost identical numbers when identifying how many of their five closest friends were born outside their region (Catalonia or the Basque Country). Furthermore, social networks were not shown to be more heterogeneous in terms of socio-economic status in either region either. Respondents from both regions displayed a tendency to have their five closest friends be of similar socio-economic status, with similar degrees of variation between Catalans and Basques.

Finally, one can see that in fact, difference existed both in Catalan and Basque social circles when considering members' views toward nationalism. This is to say that although nationalism can be a divisive issue in some contexts, friend groups in both regions displayed heterogeneous views.

It is true that significant difference is shown between the Catalan and Basque regions when considering regional versus national language usage. However, this difference in the survey data cannot indicate a relative homogeneity/heterogeneity between Catalonia and the Basque Country. I originally utilized language usage among friends as an indicator of ethnicity, in addition to the data on whether friends were born inside or outside the designated region. However, upon collecting and reflecting upon the survey results, it is clear that an external factor is influencing language usage among friends. According to data collected by the regional Basque government during the mid to late 1980s, approximately 23-24 percent of the population was bilingual in Euskara and Castilian Spanish, and less than 1 percent was monolingual in Euskara⁴. The relatively low percentage of the population that is able to converse in Euskara therefore affects the data collected above. If only 1 in 4 individuals speaks Euskara, it is unlikely that a group of five friends would choose to converse in that language⁵. In contrast, in 1981, 81.0% of residents in Catalonia reported understanding Catalan⁶, making its usage amongst friends much more plausible. For this reason, the reported differences in the respective use of

⁴ "Los datos actuales del euskara". *Euskara – Eusko Jaurlaritz*a. Gobierno Vasco. Web. 15 Apr. 2014. <http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/eu/contenidos/informacion/argitalpenak/eu_6092/adjuntos/EEH/GAZTELAN/EEH2_CAS.PDF>.

⁵ "The Basque Language." *Raixe Venete*. Web. 23 Apr. 2014. <<http://lnx.raixevenete.com/the-basque-language/>>.

⁶ "Catalan, Language of Europe". *Lengua catalana*. Generalitat de Catalunya, 2003. Web. 15 Apr. 2014. <http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/Llengcat/Documents/Publicacions/Catala%20llengua%20Europa/Arxius/cat_europa_angles_07.pdf>.

Catalan and Euskara versus Castilian Spanish cannot reliably demonstrate a difference in homogeneity amongst respondents. In this specific context, language usage amongst friends cannot be used as a measure of ethnic homogeneity or heterogeneity.

8. Basque Social Networks

In Basque society, the central unit is the cuadrilla. The cuadrilla is a group of friends that is consolidated during the early teenage years. These groups are typically all-male or all-female, and social life revolves around this form of organization. The friend groups are no more formalized than in the U.S., but there are marked differences. As opposed to having multiple social circles, all of one's closest friends are expected to be in one's cuadrilla (Ramírez 1984). After school or work, the cuadrilla will make a round at the same bars each day together. This organization of routines is perceived to be both important and unique to Basque social cohesion (Ramírez). It should be noted that these bars/café are central to Spanish culture, and in the Basque region become spaces of political conversation as well. Members of a cuadrilla are highly involved in one another's lives, and they know each other's schedules so well that they can locate each other at any time. They remain in the same cuadrilla their entire lives, and even after making other friends, they will only refer to one group as their cuadrilla. Sometimes, later in life as adults, members of a cuadrilla will formalize their bonds by creating a gastronomic society. Despite being a primarily informal social structure, the cuadrilla is very tight-knit in its membership.

Many scholars have noted the unique nature of social structure in the Basque Country; “No one who has frequently been in the Basque Region and knows, even minimally, its social framework doubts the important and equally curious role of the cuadrillas of friends on the structure of interpersonal relationships”⁷ (Ramírez 213). The role is perceived to be one of social cohesion, with the power to mobilize human resources and circulate information (Ramírez,

⁷ “Nadie que haya estado con frecuencia en el País Vasco y conozca mínimamente su entramado social duda del papel tan importante como curioso que tienen las cuadrillas de amigos en la estructura de relaciones interpersonales”

Domínguez, Reinares). These qualities render the cuadrilla useful to ETA, and set the Basque Country apart from other social environments.

Scholars have also noted, specifically, the importance of the cuadrilla in propagating information flows within the Basque communities:

“In this sense, the role of the cuadrilla as a means of diffusing everything from local to external information must be highlighted. Through the remanufacturing of the informative content of the main mass communication, of the intersubjective communication, the anonymous information of this “mass-media” becomes personal, concrete, and significant for individuals. In this way, they experience a very mediated and nuanced version of these mass media.”⁸ (Ramírez 217).

The idea of “mediation” is central to why those studying ETA as an organization, and its members, have also commented on the importance of the cuadrilla. This social structure’s ability to collect, filter, and spread information has led some to refer to the cuadrilla as “the nucleus of indoctrination (Domínguez). It is from this nucleus that cuadrillas become beneficial as a social structure, and can positively impact armed group viability.

Considering the strength of cuadrilla influence in Basque social life, it should come as no surprise that cuadrillas were central in the formation of ETA as well. The first leader of “ETA militar” (the military wing of ETA) describes their initial recruitment tactics. They called on individual members of the military wing to bring their cuadrilla members to a designated location for a “party”. However, instead of a party, ETA would provoke an incident that would

⁸ “En este sentido hay que destacar el papel de la cuadrilla como medio de difusión de toda una información tanto local como externa. A través de la reelaboración de los contenidos informativos de los grandes medios de comunicación de masas, a través de la comunicación intersubjetiva, la información anónima de estos “mass-media” se vuelve personal, concreta y significativa para los individuos, que, de este modo, realizan un consumo muy mediatizado y matizado de estos medios de comunicación de masa.”

incite police reaction, and all the individuals who were in the area would be arrested, regardless of whether or not they had been involved.⁹ In this way, ETA utilized the social structure of the cuadrilla to recruit new members; those who had already been arrested were likely to see higher gains from participation in ETA and had less to lose. The higher number of arrests increased the likelihood that members of the community would be affected by the presence of the group. Thus, they also used the social structure of the cuadrilla to draw further attention to the presence of the group in the community.

Additionally, of the ex-etarras I interviewed, most cited the influence of their cuadrilla in their decision to participate. One commented, “Yes, before I joined, there were already other classmates and friends from my cuadrilla who were members. I already knew friends from my cuadrilla who had to escape, who had left and were members of ETA.”¹⁰ While some knew individuals in exile, most cited interpersonal relationships within the community as central both before and after joining ETA. Another interviewee described in more detail the basis of friendship that existed; “He was a good friend, and he was also a brilliant student. All of us in the class looked up to him. He had the good sense to propose it as a dare if I would join or if I wouldn’t join, and I told him, “Go f--- yourself, I’m joining!”¹¹ The individuals who were not influenced by their cuadrilla to join ETA did also mention that they exerted influence on their friends either for logistical support or occasionally recruitment.

⁹ Personal interview, town of Artea, Viscaya (Spain) 2013.

¹⁰ “Sí, antes de entrar yo, había ya más compañeros y otros amigos de la cuadrilla... Y yo ya conocía a amigos de la cuadrilla y se habían tenido que escapar y que eran de la cuadrilla y se habían ido y eran de ETA, sí.” Personal interview, Bilbao (Spain) 2013

¹¹ “Era buen amigo además era un estudiante muy brillante a que teníamos cierta admiración toda la clase. Pero tuvo la gran habilidad de plantearme como reto si metía o no me metía y dije yo pues, te vas a joder pues me meto.” Personal interview, Bilbao (Spain) 2013

Despite the influence of the cuadrilla on participation, no ex-etarra characterized his or her whole entire cuadrilla as having membership in ETA. In fact, both ex-etarras and other Basque citizens characterized their own cuadrillas, as well as other cuadrillas they were familiar with, as heterogenous in membership. An examination of interview and survey data supports this description of Basque social structure as both tight-knit and heterogeneous. Interviewees cited variation in the language spoken within their friend group as indicative of this heterogeneity. Among most cuadrillas, the language most often used was Castillian Spanish. However, this was a conscious decision made by the friend groups since only some, but not all, members had learned to speak Euskara at home. This was true even among cuadrillas formed in Ikastolas (private schools taught in Euskara, with an emphasis on Basque history and culture). Ikastolas existed, although underground, during the Franco dictatorship. However, even respondents receiving primarily a Basque education described their cuadrilla as linguistically heterogeneous.

It is interesting to note that cuadrillas did not often split over membership/non-membership in ETA. Etarras and non-etarras co-existed in the same cuadrillas, and there were even cuadrillas with members holding opposite views on Basque separatism. The lack of splitting in friend groups is particularly interesting since nationalism is a divisive issue in the Basque Country. Many interviewees cited the delicate nature of discussing nationalism, even among family members. However, these same individuals described a range of political beliefs within their own cuadrillas. It is true that not every cuadrilla represented each end of the spectrum fully, but there was a range of political beliefs present: from more radical to less radical nationalism, support of separatism to denial of separatism, and even, in extreme cases, a rejection of Basque nationalism altogether.

Additionally, in terms of socio-economic status, most interviewees cited public schools as the foundation for their close friendships. These schools crossed socio-economic boundaries between neighborhoods, placing heterogeneous students together in the same classrooms. Thus, it is not surprising that one's cuadrilla would not be limited to the socio-economic status of one's own neighborhood.

9. Catalan Social Networks

When discussing Catalan society in the context of networks and social relationships, there are several important characteristics to keep in mind. First, the economic and industrial growth of the region made it a primary spot for immigrant re-location during the late 20th century. This immigration was both inter-regional and inter-state; Spanish individuals as well as international individuals resided in Catalonia, starting in the 1960s (Zimmerman 2005). This emigration persisted through the 1980s and 1990s, although individuals' motivations for emigration differed from previous decades (Zimmerman 2005). The growth of the immigrant population due to migration outnumbered the growth of the rest of the population through the 1960s and mid 1970s (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2008). The following categories of Catalan residents: of Spanish origin or from a historic community, of European origin, of origins outside Europe.

More recent statistics state that in 2003, 8.8 percent of the residents of Catalonia were immigrants, in comparison with 3.9% in this same year in Spain as a whole (Zapata-Barrero 2008). Additionally, Catalonia currently hosts 25.3% of all immigrants in Spain (Zapata-Barrero 2008). These particular statistics are not easily accessible for the time period in question, but they do seem reflective of the experiences described by Zimmerman (2005) and Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) above in the context of Catalonia during the 1970s-1980s.

Additionally, there is the presence of the Catalan language and Catalan-Castillian bilingualism present in the region. By 1986, 90 percent of the population could understand Catalan, up ten points in five years (McGarry 1993). This likely permitted the wide variation observed in the survey data between friend groups using Castillian Spanish or Catalan to

communicate with one another, contrasting the Basque Country. Furthermore, linguistic studies conducted in Catalan schools have demonstrated many of the heterogeneities mentioned above, including whether children's parents were immigrants, either from within Spain or externally (Woolard 1997). Woolard (1997) did notice a tendency toward same-sex friend groups, but noted specifically the crossing of ethnic and linguistic lines amongst friends.

In this context, it would be inaccurate to say that Catalan society in general was homogeneous. In fact, as demonstrated above, scholars have noted and studied many aspects of heterogeneity existing in Catalonia. Interview data collected from Catalan residents confirms heterogeneity across ethnic and regional lines, as well as political opinions. One of the residents explained the existence of different political opinions within her friend group as follows; "In my friend group, which was always more or less the same, yes, we knew there were some people who were part of Terra Lliure. The truth is that between us, we didn't talk about it"¹². The lack of political discussion in her friend group therefore allowed for heterogeneity to exist without major problems or splits among friends. Another interviewee explained where her friend group formed as follows; "I only had girl friends, and all of them were from a religious school. Later on they were from the Institute of Secondary Education"¹³. The fact that her friend groups originated from such insular communities would lead one to hypothesize that her social networks would be homogeneous. However, when asked to describe the socio-economic status, political opinions, and ethnic origins of her friends, the interviewee replied, "I think the group was pretty

¹² "En mi grupo juvenil, que siempre fue el mismo más o menos si que sabía que era Terra Lliure. La verdad es que hablar entre nosotros no se hablaba." Personal interview via Skype, Barcelona (Spain) 2014

¹³ "Solamente tenía amigas, todas ellas del colegio religioso. Más tarde del Instituto de Enseñanza Secundaria". Personal interview via Skype, Barcelona (Spain) 2014

heterogeneous”.¹⁴ It is true that several potentially insular communities, linguistic and ethnic, existed in Catalonia during this time period. Despite this, the above evidence refutes the hypothesis that Catalan social networks were more homogeneous than Basque social networks.

¹⁴ “Creo que el grupo era bastante heterogéneo”. Personal interview via Skype, Barcelona (Spain) 2014

10. Alternative Explanations

Given that a comparison of the data collected for the Basque and Catalan social networks does not support the hypothesized link between tight-knit, heterogeneous networks and armed group success, it is necessary to consider what other factors may help explain armed group success. One variable that has not been explored in the above analysis is the role of the government in influencing the success or failure of armed groups. It is logical to consider whether the repression of the Spanish government played an integral role in the success or failure of these armed groups. However, when comparing two groups sharing the same national government, typically the government is less likely to be a confounding variable.

It is possible, however, that even though both armed groups existed under the same central government, the government's reaction to each group varied. Since resources are finite, any government faces the choice of whether or not to crackdown on groups and individuals who break the law or challenge the government's power. If Catalonia were viewed by the Franco regime as more central, it could therefore have required a larger and more decisive government reaction. This would have led to the dissolving of the violence in Catalonia while in the more peripheral, Basque region the government reaction would have been smaller, allowing the group to persist.

On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind the various historical similarities between the two regions. First, both regions' nationalisms were repressed by the Franco regime utilizing the same mechanisms of repression. This is evidenced by the illegality of speaking either Basque or Catalan during this time period, the requirement that only the Spanish flag be displayed in either region, the prohibition of regional cultural celebrations, and the consistent arrest and/or killing of those identified as supporting separate Basque or Catalan states.

Additionally, nationalist and separatist political parties in both regions have periodically been illegalized in the name of national security. Furthermore, there are still pending cases of accused torture of both Basque and Catalan nationalists by the Spanish government that have never gone to trial. The abundant similarities in the repression of both nationalisms by the Spanish government contradict the idea that government reaction to the movements is a confounding variable explaining the success or failure of each group. With this being said, future research may want to critically assess the character of the repression in Catalonia versus the Basque Region, and theorize the relative impact of this repression on the success and failure of ETA and Terra Lliure. This could perhaps explain the weak effect of networks, if for example the differences in government repression between the two regions are a more significant factor in the groups' respective success and failure.

Alternatively, perhaps the above results do not reflect a weak effect of networks overall, rather, they indicate that networks affect armed group viability via different mechanisms. In this case, it may be that networks do not function primarily as a source of information either to/from the rebel group. Perhaps social networks matter primarily when considering a group's recruitment abilities, or alternatively in an organization's ability to retain members over time. The study of network effects provides a series of bases for the development of alternative ideas surrounding the various functions of social networks. However, more hypothesizing and testing is necessary to demonstrate an alternate effect of networks on armed group viability.

Lastly, it is possible that social networks affect armed group viability via the mechanisms put forth in the two proposed hypotheses, but the effect was not seen due to measurement error. Specifically, the aspects of identity chosen as indicative of either heterogeneity or homogeneity included socio-economic status, place of origin, and political opinions among close friends.

However, it is true that many other aspects of identity can characterize the similarities or differences existing within a social network. Thus, it is possible that Basque social networks are more heterogeneous than Catalan social networks, if one alters the categories used to determine heterogeneity. Similarly, perhaps the two regions do show important differences in the categories of socio-economic status, place of origin, and political opinions, but that the type of questions asked in the survey did not capture this variation.

11. Conclusion

As discussed in the previous chapter, it is possible that these findings are either a negative result of the hypothesis or that they indicate a flaw in the data collection. Assuming that the findings discussed above do indicate a negative test of the hypotheses, the following are important considerations moving forward. As Yong (2012) points out, between 85-90 percent of published material in the social sciences affirms a positive test of the hypothesis. However, he postulates that this does not reflect the actual percentage of positive versus negative findings; rather, it reflects a bias toward publishing positive findings. Despite this demonstrated bias, the sharing of negative findings is just as important for the advancement of knowledge as is the sharing of positive findings. Without the sharing of negative findings, scholars may spend important time and resources repeating the work others have already tested and found no support for instead of creating new hypotheses for advancement or even testing those that already exist to find additional support. For this reason, the following conclusions can still be contributed to the field, despite the fact that I did not find support for my hypotheses.

The act of crossing cleavages in a society can occur across multiple divisions, only one of which is ethnicity. The results above indicate that classifying a society as homogeneous or heterogeneous is complex because the categories themselves encompass much more than ethnic similarities or differences. For this reason, the role of ethnic homogeneity deserves more consideration in the study of conflict. Ethnicity is often seen as key in examining conflict. However, as demonstrated by the results above, ethnicity does not seem to be the most important factor in the determination of social networks, even in conflicts where a nationalist, separatist identity exists. This leads to two important considerations. First, perhaps the role of multiple aspects of identity should be further examined in the context of conflicts, and the mechanisms by

which each affects (or does not affect) conflict should be articulated. Second, while heterogeneity was not demonstrated to be important in the mechanisms articulated in this paper, other scholars should examine the role of heterogeneity in conflict and consider in what other ways heterogeneity may be important for our understanding of armed groups.

Furthermore, the question, “Why do some armed groups succeed where others do not?” remains important and also fundamentally unsatisfactorily explained. While heterogeneous, tight-knit networks did not matter for the case of Terra Lliure in comparison to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, perhaps those types of networks do matter in conflict, but just in different ways. Or perhaps, social networks do not affect the relative success of some armed groups over others because of external factors, such as the strength of the government forces, or the historical moment in which the armed movement begins, etc. In any case, the negative findings shown above indicate once again that an important puzzle exists when considering armed group viability and the factors affecting a group’s respective “success” or “failure”.

Bibliography

- Biernacki, P. and D. Waldorf. "Snowball sampling: problem and techniques of chain referral sampling." *Sociological Methods and Research* 10, no. 2 (1981): 141-163. Web.
- Cohen, Nissim and Tamar Arieli. "Field research in conflict environments: Methodological challenges and snowball sampling." *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 4 (2011): 423-435.
- Conversi, Daniele. *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization*. (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1997).
- Denscombe, Martyn. *The Good Research Guide: For Small-scale Social Research Projects*. (Buckingham: Open UP, 1998).
- Domínguez, Florencio. *Dentro De ETA: La Vida Diaria De Los Terroristas*. (Madrid: Aguilar, 2002).
- Fernández Huertas Moraga, Jesús and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell. "Immigration in Catalonia". *El Centre d'Estudis de Temes Contemporanis (CETC)*. 2008.
- Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006).
- Gould, Roger V. "Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871." *American Sociological Review* 56, no. 6 (1991): 716-729.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096251>.
- Guevara, Che. *Guerilla Warfare, third edition*. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1997).
- Hargreaves, John. *Freedom for Catalonia?: Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- Kalyvas, Stathis. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Lewis, Janet. "Why Incipient Rebellions Fail." *Working Paper*. 2013.
- Lilli, Jacques. "Basques, Catalans, Primordialism and Violence." *Cuadernos de Sección. Historia-Geografía* 22, (1994): 323-358.
<http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFAnlt/vasconia/vas22/22323358.pdf>.
- Mastrovito, Frank. *Basque and Catalan Nationalism: A Comparison*. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993).

- McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts*. (London: Routledge, 1993).
- Parkinson, Sarah. "Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 3 (2013): 418-432.
- Platzer, Hazel, and Trudi James. "Methodological Issues Conducting Sensitive Research on Lesbian and Gay Men's Experience of Nursing Care." *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 25, no. 3 (1997): 626-33. Print.
- Ramírez Goicoechea, Eugenia. "Cuadrillas en el País Vasco: Identidad local y revitalización étnica." *Revista española de investigaciones sociológicas* 25, (1984): 213-222. Web.
- Reinares, Fernando. *Patriotas De La Muerte: Por Qué Han Militado En ETA Y Cuándo Abandonan*. (Madrid: Taurus, 2011).
- Staniland, Paul. "Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia." *International Security* 37, no. 1 (2012): 142-177.
- Streeton, Rosemarie, Mary Cooke, and Jackie Campbell. "Researching the researchers: Using a snowballing technique". *Nurse Researcher* 12, no. 1 (2004): 35-46. Web.
- Strong, Wm. T. "The Fueros of Northern Spain." *Political Science Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (1893): 317.
- Weinstein, Jeremy. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Wood, Elisabeth. "The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008): 539-561.
- Woolard, Kathryn A. "Catalan as a Public Language." In *Contemporary Catalonia in Spain and Europe*, ed. Milton Azevedo. University of California at Berkeley (1991): 50-61.
- Yong, Ed. "Replication studies: Bad copy." *Nature International Weekly Journal of Science* 485 (2012): 289-300. Web.
- Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. *Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations*. (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009).
- Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. *La Inmigración En Naciones Minoritarias: Flandes, Quebec Y Cataluña En Perspectiva*. (Barcelona: Icaria Editorial, 2008).
- Zedong, Mao. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961).

Zimmermann, Klaus F. *European Migration: What Do We Know?* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005).

Appendix 1: Survey Questions

1. ¿En qué año nació usted?

Por favor, responda a las siguientes preguntas, **pensando en época en que usted tenía entre 12 y 18 años**:

2. En esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años), ¿cuántos amigos íntimos tenía usted?
3. En esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años), ¿cuántas veces por semana se comunicaba con los amigos cercanos que acaba de mencionar?
4. En esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años), ¿cuántas veces por semana quedaba con estos amigos cercanos para verse?
5. ¿Aproximadamente cuánto tiempo se veían cada vez que quedaban?
 - a. Menos de una hora
 - b. Entre una y dos horas
 - c. Más de dos horas
6. En esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años), ¿cuántas veces por semana se comunicaba con otros amigos?
7. En esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años), ¿cuántas veces por semana quedaba con esos amigos menos cercanos para verse?
8. ¿Aproximadamente cuánto tiempo se veían con esos amigos cuando quedaban?
 - a. Menos de una hora
 - b. Entre una y dos horas
 - c. Más de dos horas
9. Por favor piense en sus 5 amigos más cercanos de esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años). Por favor, dígame, ¿cuántos de ellos pertenecían a familias de...
 - a. ingresos bajos?
 - b. ingresos medio bajos?
 - c. ingresos medios?
 - d. ingresos medio altos?
 - e. ingresos altos?
10. De sus 5 amigos más cercanos de esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años), por favor dígame, con cuántos de ellos hablaba en catalán y con cuántos hablaba en castellano?
11. De sus 5 amigos más cercanos de esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años), ¿cuántos nacieron fuera de Cataluña?
12. De sus 5 amigos más cercanos de esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años):
 - a. ¿Cuántos tenían opiniones parecidas a las suyas en cuanto al nacionalismo?
 - b. ¿Cuántos tenían opiniones diferentes a las suyas en cuanto al nacionalismo?
13. En esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años) usted...
 - a. Se identificaba con algún partido político específico
 - b. No se identificaba con ningún partido político específico
14. De sus 5 amigos más cercanos de esa época (entre sus 12 y 18 años):
 - a. ¿Cuántos se identificaban con algún partido político específico?
 - b. ¿Cuántos no se identificaban con ningún partido político?
 - c. No sabe
15. ¿En qué idioma se hablaba en su hogar en esa época?

- a. Castellano
 - b. Catalán
 - c. Ambos
 - d. Otro
16. ¿A qué clase socio-económica pertenecían usted y su familia (cuando tenía 12-18 años)?
- a. Ingresos bajos
 - b. Ingresos medio bajos
 - c. Ingresos medios
 - d. Ingresos medio altos
 - e. Ingresos altos
17. ¿Conoció en esa época a alguien que fuera miembro de Terra Lliure?
18. ¿Fue usted, en algún momento, miembro de Terra Lliure?

Appendix 2: Translated Survey Questions

1. In what year were you born?

Please respond to the following questions **thinking back to the time when you were between 12 and 18 years old**:

2. During that time, (when you were between 12-18 years old), how many close friends did you have?
3. During that time, (when you were between 12-18 years old), how many times per week did you communicate with the close friends you just mentioned?
4. During that time, (when you were between 12-18 years old), how many times per week did you hang out with those close friends?
5. Approximately how long did you spend together each time you hung out?
 - a. Less than an hour
 - b. Between one and two hours
 - c. More than two hours
6. During that time, (when you were between 12-18 years old), how many times per week did you communicate with other friends?
7. During that time, (when you were between 12-18 years old), how many times per week did you hang out with these other friends who were not as close?
8. During that time, (when you were between 12-18 years old), how many close friends did you have?
9. Approximately how long did you spend with these other friends when you hung out?
 - a. Less than an hour
 - b. Between one and two hours
 - c. More than two hours
10. Please think about your 5 closest friends during that time (when you were between 12-18 years old). Please, tell me, how many of them were from the following types of families?
 - a. Low income
 - b. Working class
 - c. Middle class
 - d. Upper middle class
 - e. High income
11. Of your 5 closest friends from that time (when you were between 12-18 years old), please tell me, with how many of them did you speak in Catalan and with how many did you speak in Spanish?
12. Of your 5 closest friends from that time (when you were between 12-18 years old), how many were born outside of Catalonia?
13. Of your 5 closest friends from that time (when you were between 12-18 years old),
 - a. How many had opinions similar to yours on topics of nationalism?
 - b. How many had different opinions to yours on topics of nationalism?
14. At that time, (when you were between 12-18 years old) you...
 - a. Identified with a specific political party
 - b. Did not identify with a specific political party
15. Of your 5 closest friends from that time (when you were between 12-18 years old):

- a. How many identified with a specific political party?
 - b. How many did not identify with a specific political party?
 - c. Unknown
16. What language did you speak at home during that time?
- a. Spanish
 - b. Catalan
 - c. Both
 - d. Other
17. To what socio-economic class did you and your family belong (when you were between 12-18 years old)?
- a. Low income
 - b. Working class
 - c. Middle class
 - d. Upper middle class
 - e. High income
18. During this time, did you know anyone who was a member of Terra Lliure?
19. Were you, at any time, a member of Terra Lliure?